## $\pi$ -Cipher $^1$

Designers: Danilo Gligoroski $^2$  and Hristina Mihajloska $^3$  and Simona Samardjiska $^{23}$  and Håkon Jacobsen $^2$  and Mohamed El-Hadedy $^2$  and Rune Erlend Jensen $^4$ 

Submitter: Hristina Mihajloska hristina.mihajloska@finki.ukim.mk

Update to  $\pi$ -Cipher v2, November 2014

 $<sup>^1</sup>$ Since, the name of the cipher contains the Greek letter  $\pi$ , in the software implementations we will use the name PiCipher. More precisely in this document we propose the following six variants of the cipher: Pi16Cipher096v2, Pi16Cipher128v2, Pi32Cipher128v2, Pi32Cipher256v2, Pi64Cipher128v2, Pi64Cipher256v2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>ITEM, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>FCSE, "Ss Cyril and Methodius" University, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>IDI, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

## Update from $\pi$ -Cipher v1

This document is the summary of the updates from v1 to v2 of the  $\pi$ -Cipher documentation.

#### Update in Chapter 1. Specification

This chapter contains correction on the padding rule that leads to easy forgery strategy as it was pointed out by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Fuhr [1].

In Version 1, the padding rule for the last block of the AD is the following:

$$AD_a \leftarrow \begin{cases} AD_a & \text{if } |AD_a| = bitrate, \\ AD_a||10^* & \text{if } |AD_a| < bitrate, \end{cases}$$

where 1 represents the byte 0x01, and 0 represents the byte 0x00.

In Version 1, the padding rule for the last block of the message M is the following:

$$M_m \leftarrow \begin{cases} M_m & \text{if } |M_m| = bitrate, \\ M_m||10^* & \text{if } |M_m| < bitrate, \end{cases}$$

where 1 represents the byte 0x01, and 0 represents the byte 0x00.

In order to solve the issue pointed out in [1] we modify the padding rule as following: "Append 1 in any case, and fill the rest of the block with 0s". Thus, the changes will be: The padding rule for the associated data AD is the following:

$$AD = AD_1 ||AD_2|| \dots ||AD_a|| 10^*$$

where 1 represents the byte 0x01, and 0 represents the byte 0x00.

The padding rule for the message M is the following:

$$M = M_1 ||M_2|| \dots ||M_m|| 10^*$$

where 1 represents the byte 0x01, and 0 represents the byte 0x00.

Note that if the associated data AD (the message M) has length that is a multiple of the *bitrate*, then the number of processed blocks of AD (M) is increased by one, and thus  $a \leftarrow a + 1$  ( $m \leftarrow m + 1$ ).

### Update in Chapter 4. Features

In this chapter we give clarification about the feature *Tag second preimage resistance* - resistance against finding second preimage for an authentication tag when the key is known (insider attack) for short messages.

# Acknowledgment

We would like to thank Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Fuhr for their detailed observation on the  $\pi$ -Cipher, pointing out the problem with the padding function in v1, and giving us a note for removing a bug in the reference C code.

# References

[1] Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Fuhr. Observation on picipher. Message on the cryptocompetitions mailing list, November, 2014.