

**ACORN:
A Lightweight Authenticated Cipher
(v3)**

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Chapter 1

Specification

The specifications of ACORN-128 are given in this chapter.

1.1 Recommended parameter sets

- Primary Recommendation: ACORN-128
128-bit key, 128-bit nonce, 128-bit tag
Use Case 1: Lightweight applications (resource constrained environments)
Use Case 2: High-performance applications

1.2 Operations, Variables and Functions

The operations, variables and functions used in ACORN are defined below.

1.2.1 Operations

The following operations are used in ACORN:

\oplus	:	bit-wise exclusive OR
$\&$:	bit-wise AND
\sim	:	bit-wise NOT
\parallel	:	concatenation

1.2.2 Variables and constants

The following variables and constants are used in ACORN:

AD	:	associated data (this data will not be encrypted or decrypted).
ad_i	:	one bit of associated data block.
$adlen$:	bit length of the associated data with $0 \leq adlen < 2^{64}$.
C	:	ciphertext.

c_i	:	the i th ciphertext bit.
ca_i	:	a control bit at the i th step. It is used to separate the processing of associated data, the processing of plaintext, and the generation of authentication tag.
cb_i	:	another control bit at the i th step. It is used to allow a keystream bit to affect a feedback bit during initialization, processing of associated data, and the tag generation.
IV_{128}	:	128-bit initialization vector of ACORN-128.
$IV_{128,i}$:	the i th bit of IV_{128} .
K_{128}	:	128-bit key of ACORN-128.
$K_{128,i}$:	the i th bit of K_{128} .
ks_i	:	The keystream bit generated at the i th step.
$pclen$:	bit length of the plaintext/ciphertext with $0 \leq pclen < 2^{64}$.
m_i	:	one data bit.
P	:	plaintext.
p_i	:	the i th plaintext bit.
S_i	:	state at the beginning of the i th step.
$S_{i,j}$:	j th bit of state S_i . For ACORN-128, $0 \leq j \leq 292$.
T	:	authentication tag.
t	:	bit length of the authentication tag with $64 \leq t \leq 128$.

1.2.3 Functions

Two Boolean functions are used in ACORN: maj and ch .

$$\begin{aligned} maj(x, y, z) &= (x \& y) \oplus (x \& z) \oplus (y \& z) ; \\ ch(x, y, z) &= (x \& y) \oplus ((\sim x) \& z) ; \end{aligned}$$

1.3 ACORN-128

ACORN-128 uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit initialization vector. The associated data length and the plaintext length are less than 2^{64} bits. The authentication tag length is less than or equal to 128 bits. We recommend the use of a 128-bit tag.

1.3.1 The state of ACORN-128

The state size of ACORN-128 is 293 bits. There are six LFSRs being concatenated in ACORN-128. The state is shown in Fig.1.1.

1.3.2 The functions of ACORN-128

There are three functions in ACORN-128: the function to generate keystream bit from the state, the function to compute the overall feedback bit, and the




Figure 1.1: The concatenation of 6 LFSRs in ACORN-128. f_i indicates the overall feedback bit for the i th step; m_i indicates the message bit for the i th step.

function to update the state.

Generate the Keystream Bit. At each step, the keystream bit is computed using the function $ks_i = KSG128(S_i)$:

$$ks_i = S_{i,12} \oplus S_{i,154} \oplus maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193}) \oplus ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66});$$

Compute the Feedback Bit. At each step, the feedback bit is computed using the function $f_i = FBK128(S_i, ca_i, cb_i)$:

$$f_i = S_{i,0} \oplus (\sim S_{i,107}) \oplus maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160}) \oplus (ca_i \& S_{i,196}) \oplus (cb_i \& ks_i) ;$$

The State Update Function. At each step, the pseudo code for the state update function $S_{i+1} = StateUpdate128(S_i, m_i, ca_i, cb_i)$ is given as :

```

/*step 1. update using six LFSRs */
Si,289 = Si,289 ⊕ Si,235 ⊕ Si,230;
Si,230 = Si,230 ⊕ Si,196 ⊕ Si,193;
Si,193 = Si,193 ⊕ Si,160 ⊕ Si,154;
Si,154 = Si,154 ⊕ Si,111 ⊕ Si,107;
Si,107 = Si,107 ⊕ Si,66 ⊕ Si,61;
Si,61 = Si,61 ⊕ Si,23 ⊕ Si,0;

/*step 2. generate keystream bit */
ksi = KSG128(Si);

/*step 3. generate the nonlinear feedback bit */
fi = FBK128(Si, cai, cbi);

/*step 4. shift the 293-bit register with the feedback bit fi */
for j := 0 to 291 do Si+1,j = Si,j+1 ;
Si+1,292 = fi ⊕ mi ;

```

1.3.3 The initialization of ACORN-128

The initialization of ACORN-128 consists of loading the key and IV into the state, and running the cipher for 1792 steps.

1. Initialize the state S_{-1792} to 0.
2. Let $m_{-1792+i} = K_{128,i}$ for $i = 0$ to 127;
 Let $m_{-1792+128+i} = IV_{128,i}$ for $i = 0$ to 127;
 Let $m_{-1792+256} = K_{128,i \bmod 128} \oplus 1$ for $i = 0$;
 Let $m_{-1792+256+i} = K_{128,i \bmod 128}$ for $i = 1$ to 1535;
3. Let $ca_{-1792+i} = 1$ for $i = 0$ to 1791;
 Let $cb_{-1792+i} = 1$ for $i = 0$ to 1791;
4. for $i = -1792$ to -1 , $S_{i+1} = \text{StateUpdate128}(S_i, m_i, ca_i, cb_i)$;

Note that in the initialization, the keystream bit is used to update the state since $cb_i = 1$.

1.3.4 Processing the associated data

After the initialization, the associated data AD is used to update the state.

1. Let $m_i = ad_i$ for $i = 0$ to $adlen - 1$;
 Let $m_{adlen} = 1$;
 Let $m_{adlen+i} = 0$ for $i = 1$ to 255;
2. Let $ca_i = 1$ for $i = 0$ to $adlen+127$;
 Let $ca_i = 0$ for $i = adlen+128$ to $adlen+255$;
 Let $cb_i = 1$ for $i = 0$ to $adlen+255$;
3. for $i = 0$ to $adlen + 255$, $S_{i+1} = \text{StateUpdate128}(S_i, m_i, ca_i, cb_i)$;

Note that even when there is no associated data, we still need to run the cipher for 256 steps. When we process the associated data, the keystream bit is used to update the state since $cb_i = 1$. The cipher specification is changed for 128 steps (since the value of ca_i is set to 0 for 128 steps) so as to separate the associated data from the plaintext/ciphertext. Here separating the associated data from the plaintext/ciphertext means preventing using part of the associated data as ciphertext, or using part of the ciphertext as associated data.

1.3.5 The encryption

After processing the associated data, at each step of the encryption, one plaintext bit p_i is used to update the state, and p_i is encrypted to c_i .

1. Let $m_{adlen+256+i} = p_i$ for $i = 0$ to $pclen - 1$;
 Let $m_{adlen+256+pclen} = 1$;
 Let $m_{adlen+256+pclen+i} = 0$ for $i = 1$ to 255;
2. Let $ca_i = 1$ for $i = adlen + 256$ to $adlen + pclen + 383$;
 Let $ca_i = 0$ for $i = adlen + pclen + 384$ to $adlen + pclen + 511$;
 Let $cb_i = 0$ for $i = adlen + 256$ to $adlen + pclen + 511$;

3. for $i = adlen + 256$ to $adlen + pclen + 511$,
 - $S_{i+1} = \text{StateUpdate128}(S_i, m_i, ca_i, cb_i)$;
 - $c_{i-adlen-256} = p_{i-adlen-256} \oplus ks_i$;
 - (when performing encryption, $0 \leq i - adlen - 256 \leq pclen - 1$)
- end for;

Note that even when there is no plaintext, we still need to run the cipher for 256 steps. When we process the plaintext, the keystream bit is not used to update the state since $cb_i = 0$. The cipher specification is changed for 128 steps (since the value of ca_i is set to 0 for 128 steps) so as to separate the processing of plaintext/ciphertext and the finalization. Here separating the finalization from the plaintext/ciphertext means preventing using part of the keystream (obtained from plaintext and ciphertext) as the authentication tag.

1.3.6 The finalization

After processing all the plaintext bits, we generate the authentication tag T .

1. Let $m_{adlen+pcen+512+i} = 0$ for $i = 0$ to 767;
 2. Let $ca_i = 1$ for $i = adlen + pclen + 512$ to $adlen + pclen + 1279$;
Let $cb_i = 1$ for $i = adlen + pclen + 512$ to $adlen + pclen + 1279$;
 3. for $i = adlen + pclen + 512$ to $adlen + pclen + 1279$,
 - $S_{i+1} = \text{StateUpdate128}(S_i, m_i, ca_i, cb_i)$;
- end for;

The authentication tag T is the last t keystream bits, i.e.,
 $T = ks_{adlen+pcen+1279-t+1} \parallel ks_{adlen+pcen+1279-t+2} \parallel \dots \parallel ks_{adlen+pcen+1279}$.

1.3.7 The decryption and verification

The decryption and verification are very similar to the encryption and tag generation. The finalization in the decryption process is the same as that in the encryption process. We emphasize that if the verification fails, the ciphertext and the newly generated authentication tag should not be given as output; otherwise, the state of ACORN-128 is vulnerable to known-plaintext or chosen-ciphertext attacks (using a fixed IV).

Chapter 2

Security Goals

The security goals of ACORN are given in Table 2.1. In ACORN, each key, IV pair is used to protect only one message. If verification fails, the new tag and the decrypted ciphertext should not be given as output.

Note that the authentication security in Table 2.1 includes the integrity security of plaintext, associated data and nonce.

Table 2.1: Security Goals of ACORN-128 (128-bit tag)

	Encryption	Authentication
ACORN-128	128-bit	128-bit

Chapter 3

Security Analysis

The following requirements should be satisfied in order to use ACORN securely.

1. Each key should be generated in a secure and random way.
2. Each key and *IV* pair should not be used to protect more than one message; and each key and *IV* pair should not be used with two different tag sizes.
3. If verification fails, the decrypted plaintext and the wrong authentication tag should not be given as output.

If the above requirements are satisfied, we have the following security claims:

Claim 1. The success rate of a forgery attack is 2^{-t} , where t is the tag size. If the forgery attack is repeated n times, the success rate of a forgery attack is about $n \times 2^{-t}$.

Claim 2. The state and key cannot be recovered faster than exhaustive key search if the forgery attack is not successful. We recommend the use of a 128-bit tag size for ACORN in order to resist repeated forgery attacks.

If an *IV* is reused in encryption, or if the plaintext is leaked in the failed verification, the state can be recovered easily. In [4], it is shown that if the *IV* is reused seven times, the security of ACORN is lost. We point out here that in the new version of ACORN, the secret key of ACORN cannot be recovered easily from the state since the initialization is now non-invertible if the secret key is unknown, so now ACORN protects the secret key against the nonce reuse attack.

According to our analysis, ACORN is a strong cipher. Since the design approach of ACORN is very new, we encourage the researchers to conduct thorough security analysis of ACORN.

In this chapter, we focus on the security analysis of authentication, since it is very challenging to design and analyze the differential propagation in an authenticated cipher based on a bit-oriented sequential stream cipher.

3.1 The security of initialization

The initialization can be attacked by analyzing the relation between IV and keystream. In ACORN-128, the IV passes through at least 1792 steps before affecting ciphertext. The initialization is designed to prevent various attacks against stream cipher initialization: the linear attack (such as the attack in [22]), differential attacks (such as the attacks in [24] and [23]) and cube attacks [9, 10].

3.1.1 Differential analysis of initialization

In this section, we analyze the difference propagation in the state. In our analysis, we introduce difference into IV, then compute the differential probability in each step. The initialization of ACORN is invertible (for a given known key), so every difference in the IV passes through the complete initialization.

In the initialization, $f_i \oplus ks_i$ is used as the nonlinear feedback bit. In our first experiment, we assume that after the IV being loaded in the state, there is a difference at $state_{292}$ at the beginning of the i th step, and every state bit at this step is secret. We also assume that the difference in $f_j \oplus ks_j$ is always eliminated whenever possible. The differential probability is 2^{-227} after 400 steps.

In our second experiment, we tried to improve the first experiment so as to minimize the difference in the right most LFSR. For example, if there is difference in $S_{j,234} \oplus S_{j,239}$, and if there is chance to introduce difference in $f_j \oplus ks_j$, we always introduce difference in $f_j \oplus ks_j$ so as to eliminate a difference bit in the right most LFSR at the $(j + 4)$ th step (here S_j is the state at the j th step after the operation of those 6 LFSRs, but before the shift operation). The differential probability is 2^{-232} after 400 steps, not better than the first experiment.

In our third experiment, we tried to improve the first experiment so that there are more difference bits at the beginning of the i th step. For example, we tested the differences at $S_{i,230}$, $S_{i,235}$ and $S_{i,289}$. The differential probability is 2^{-293} after 400 steps, not better than the first experiment. Another example, we tested the differences at $S_{i,61}$, $S_{i,66}$ and $S_{i,107}$. The differential probability is 2^{-289} after 400 steps, not better than the first experiment. It indicates that introducing more initial difference bits may give even lower differential probability.

From the above experiments, we think that the ACORN initialization has large security margin against differential cryptanalysis.

3.1.2 Cube analysis of initialization

Cube attack is effective against the ciphers with low algebraic degree, or against the ciphers with high algebraic degree but the system of nonlinear equations of the cipher is very sparse. In the ACORN initialization, there are 6 linear feedback shift registers, and there are 14 taps being used in the feedback (keystream

is also used for feedback in the initialization), we expect that the system of equations of ACORN would be dense.

We performed experiments to estimate the algebraic degrees of state bits in terms of the input. In particular, we analyze whether the term $iv_{i_0} \cdot iv_{i_1} \cdot iv_{i_2} \cdot iv_{i_3} \cdots iv_{i_{n-1}}$ affects every state bits state bits. In our experiments, we focus on the term $iv_{i_0} \cdot iv_{i_1} \cdot iv_{i_2} \cdot iv_{i_3} \cdots iv_{i_{n-1}}$ which is the product of the last n bits of IV. Note that in the initialization, the i th IV bit is XORed to the state at the $(256 + i)$ th step, so the last n bits of the IV bits are expected to have the least effect on the state. In the experiments, we set the rest of the IV bits to zero, and use 16 random keys for confirmation.

Table 3.1 shows the minimum number of steps that are needed so that every state bit is affected by the term $iv_{128-n} \cdot iv_{128-n+1} \cdots iv_{127}$, which is the product of the last n bits of IV. Note that for $n = 1$, it takes 669 steps so that the last IV bit iv_{127} affects all the state bits. The reason is that iv_{127} is XORed to the state at the 255th step, then it takes at least 292 steps for this bit being shifted through the state, so at least 548 steps are needed for iv_{127} to affect every state bit.

Table 3.1: The minimum number of steps for every state bit being affected by $iv_{128-n} \cdot iv_{128-n+1} \cdots iv_{127}$

n	steps	n	steps	n	steps	n	steps
1	669	9	891	17	931	25	955
2	736	10	894	18	933	26	957
3	781	11	894	19	933	27	961
4	796	12	896	20	938	28	964
5	806	13	906	21	942	29	965
6	843	14	912	22	949	30	966
7	852	15	923	23	950	31	972
8	869	16	931	24	954	32	974

From Table 3.1, our observation is that as the cube size increases, the minimum number of steps increases at a decelerated pace. From cube size 1 to 8, the minimum number of steps increases from 669 to 869 (increment: 200 steps); from cube size 9 to 16, the minimum number of steps increases from 891 to 931 steps (increment: 40 steps); from cube size 17 to 24, the minimum number of steps increases from 931 to 954 (increment: 33 steps); from cube size 25 to 32, the minimum number of steps increases from 955 to 974 (increment: 19 steps). Even if we assume that the increment of the minimum of steps is less than 4 as the cube size increases by 1, the minimum number of steps is at most $974 + 4 \times 96 = 1358$. We thus expect that ACORN has large security margin against the cube attack.

3.2 The security of encryption

We emphasize here that ACORN encryption is a stream cipher with a large state which is updated continuously. The attacks against a block cipher cannot be applied directly to ACORN.

3.2.1 Statistical attacks against encryption

If the IV is used only once for each key, it is impossible to apply a differential attack to the encryption process. It is extremely difficult to apply a linear attack to recover the secret state since the state of ACORN is updated in a nonlinear way. In general, it would be difficult to apply any statistical attack to recover the secret state due to the nonlinear state update function (the statistical correlation between any two states vanishes quickly as the distance between them increases).

3.2.2 Traditional attacks against encryption

The traditional attacks against stream ciphers (such as fast correlation attack, algebraic and fast algebraic attack) exploit the linear state update function in stream ciphers. The state of ACORN is updated in a nonlinear way, and every state bit affects the whole state, so ACORN is strong against those powerful attacks on stream ciphers (correlation and fast correlation attack [21, 20, 17, 18, 5], algebraic attack and fast algebraic attacks [6, 7]).

Time-memory-data trade-off attacks are powerful against stream ciphers with small states [2, 13, 3]. **In general, if the state size of a stream cipher is at least twice of the key size, the stream cipher is strong against the time-memory-data trade-off attacks.** For example, for a stream cipher with n -bit key and $2n$ -bit state, the simple time-memory-data trade-off attack [2, 13] requires 2^n data and 2^n memory in order to break the cipher with time 2^n . In the advanced time-memory-data trade-off attack [3], under the condition that the pre-computing time does not exceed 2^n , the attack requires 2^n data, and the attack complexity is $T \times M^2 = 2^{2n}$, where T and M are time and memory, respectively (there is additional constraint on the time and data). Note that if we apply Hellman's time-memory trade-off attack [16] directly to this stream cipher, the attack complexity is 2^n pre-computation, negligible amount of data and $T \times M^2 = 2^{2n}$. Hellman's time-memory trade-off attack is a general attack against all the symmetric key ciphers, so **any attack which is more expensive than Hellman's time-memory trade-off attack is ineffective.** The results above show that for a stream cipher with n -bit key and $2n$ -bit state, the time-memory-data trade-off attack performs much worse than Hellman's time-memory trade-off attack (especially if we consider the data), so **the time-memory-data trade-off attack is not a threat to a stream cipher with $2n$ -bit state in practice.**

The state size of ACORN is more than twice of the key size, so ACORN is strong against the time-memory-trade-off attack.

3.2.3 Guess-and-determine attack on encryption

Guess-and-determine attack can be applied to analyze the stream ciphers based on linear or nonlinear state update functions [14, 19, 12]. In the guess-and-determine attack, part of the secret information is guessed so as to recover more state information.

In ACORN, each keystream bit gives a nonlinear equation involving the state bits:

$$ks_i = S_{i,12} \oplus S_{i,154} \oplus maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193}) \oplus ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66});$$

If we guess that $maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193})$ always gives the output $S_{i,61}$ (with probability $\frac{3}{4}$), and the function $ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66})$ always gives the output $S_{i,66}$ (assume $S_{i,230} = 0$), we obtain a linear equation

$$ks_i = S_{i,12} \oplus S_{i,154} \oplus S_{i,61} \oplus S_{i,66};$$

The probability for this linear function to hold is $\frac{3}{4} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{8}$. Thus with probability $\frac{3}{8}$, we can obtain 2 linear equations involving the state bits (another linear equation is $S_{i,230} = 0$). Even if we assume that the nonlinear feedback function does not affect the guess-and-determine attack, we need 293 linear equations to recover the state, and the probability to obtain 293 linear equations is at most $(\frac{3}{8})^{292/2} = 2^{-206}$. The analysis above shows that ACORN has large security margin against the guess-and-determine attack.

3.3 The security of message authentication before finalization

A common approach to attack ACORN authentication is to inject a difference into the state by modifying ciphertext or associated data. Ensuring the security of authentication is the most challenging part in the design and security analysis of ACORN.

A main feature of ACORN-128 is the concatenation of 6 small LFSRs, as shown in Fig. 1.1. The concatenation of six LFSRs ensures that once a difference bit is injected into the state (the first difference bit must be injected into the state through m_i), there are many difference bits in the state before the state difference gets eliminated.

To eliminate the difference in the right most LFSR, the input difference to that LFSR should have the following linear recurrence (in order to reduce the number of difference bits in the state, we consider only the shortest linear recurrence):

$$d_n = d_{n-59} \oplus d_{n-54}$$

Similarly, in order to eliminate the difference in each of the other five LFSRs, the input difference should have the following linear recurrences:

$$\begin{aligned}
d_n &= d_{n-37} \oplus d_{n-34} \\
d_n &= d_{n-39} \oplus d_{n-33} \\
d_n &= d_{n-47} \oplus d_{n-43} \\
d_n &= d_{n-46} \oplus d_{n-41} \\
d_n &= d_{n-61} \oplus d_{n-38}
\end{aligned}$$

Combining the above six linear occurrences, the input difference to those six registers is given below. There are other input differences, but this difference is likely the shortest one (290 bits).

```

100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001100111010100110000001000010100
0001001111100010001110110101011010001100101110101100101110100010
110111110001011110111110100101110011100100011101110010011101010
001001001110011001111111111110010000101110100000011001011000000
0101101100000110110100001011011001

```

Once the input difference to those six registers is known, we are able to compute the probability that the difference in the state can be eliminated. **Note that the difference in the overall feedback bit f_i can always get eliminated with certain probability by modifying the ciphertext or associated data.** The details of the computation are given in Appendix A and B.

The analysis of the difference in associated data and the analysis of the difference in ciphertext are similar (except that the ciphertext leaks the state information which is useful for the attack). The reason is that when the associated data gets processed, the keystream bit is used as part of the feedback bit; when the ciphertext gets processed, the keystream is generated and xored to the ciphertext, then the decrypted plaintext bit is used as part of the feedback bit (i.e., the keystream bit also affects the input difference to the LFSRs).

We note that at each step, there are three nonlinear functions being involved: two *maj* functions and one *ch* function. The differential property of function *maj* is that if there are one or two input difference bits, then the output difference is 1 with probability 0.5; if there are three input difference bits, then the output difference is 1 with probability 1. The differential property of function *ch*(x, y, z) is that if there are differences in both y and z , then the output difference is one with probability 1; otherwise, if there is any difference in the input, the output difference is 1 with probability 0.5.

According to the above input difference to the LFSRs and the differential properties of the nonlinear functions, the probability to eliminate the difference in the state is 2^{-181} (in a successful attack, proper difference should be injected into associated data or ciphertext so that the input difference to LFSRs is not affected by the nonlinear functions). With this differential probability, ACORN is able to provide 128-bit MAC security.

Note that in the forgery attack, an attacker can only modify the ciphertext or the associated data. If the IV is reused, an attacker can modify the plaintext so that two different plaintexts can have the same authentication tag. For ACORN, the success rate of the forgery attack under IV reuse is 2^{-120} . However, if IV

is reused in ACORN, there is more serious state recovery attack, and messages can be forged once the state is recovered. So this type of forgery attack is not a concern in the design of ACORN.

3.4 The security of finalization

The finalization stage is to resist the forgery attack. In our analysis in Section 3.1.1, the differential probability is less than 2^{-200} after 400 steps. We thus expect that the finalization of ACORN has large security margin against the forgery attack.

Chapter 4

Features

- Novel design. ACORN is a bit-based sequential authenticated cipher in which the difference is injected into the state for authentication for better performance. It is the first time that this type of authenticated cipher is designed based on bit-based sequential stream cipher. The challenge in this design approach is to achieve high authentication security, and we solved this problem by using six concatenated linear feedback shift registers to ensure that it is expensive to eliminate the difference in the state, and it is easy to analyze the authentication security.
- One message bit bit is processed in each step. This feature benefits light-weight hardware implementation, and the control circuit in the hardware implementation can be greatly simplified.
- ACORN allows parallel computation. In ACORN, 32 steps can be computed in parallel. This parallel feature benefits high speed hardware and software implementation.
- Length information of associated data and plaintext/ciphertext is not needed in ACORN, i.e., ACORN does not need to check the length of message, and ACORN does not need to pad the message to a multiple of block size (the length of the bits being padded is fixed in ACORN). This feature reduces further the cost of hardware implementation.
- Efficient in Hardware.
According to our estimation, the hardware cost of ACORN-128 is slightly higher than that of TRIVIUM [8], which is very efficient in hardware.
- Efficient in Software
In ACORN, 32 steps can be computed in parallel, so its software speed is reasonably fast.
- ACORN has several advantages over AES-GCM: ACORN is more hardware efficient than AES-GCM (especially for hardware resource and energy consumption). On the general computing devices (no AES-NI and no

polynomial computing circuits), ACORN is more efficient than AES-GCM in software. The code size of ACORN is very small.

Chapter 5

The Performance of ACORN

Hardware Performance. Tao Huang implemented ACORN in VHDL. In one implementation, 8 steps are computed in parallel, so the cipher processes 8 bits at the same time. This version is fast and small in hardware. On the Xilinx Virtex 7, 499 LUTs are used, and the speed is 3.4 Gbits/s. Currently this area is much smaller than the other CAESAR candidates [11]. It can be expected that the area can be reduced further if we compute only one or two steps at the same time.

In another implementation, 32 steps are computed in parallel, so the cipher processes 32 bits at the same time. This version is quite fast in hardware. On Xilinx Virtex 7, 979 LUTs are used, and the speed is 11.3 Gbits/s.

Software Performance. We implemented ACORN in C code. We tested the speed on Intel Core i7-6550U 2.2GHz processor (Skylake) running 64-bit Windows 10 and turning off the Turbo Boost. The compiler being used is gcc 5.3.0 of Cygwin64 2.874, and the optimization option “-O3” is used. In our test, associated data is not considered and 128-bit tag is used. The test is performed by processing a message repeatedly and printing out the final message.

Table 5.1: The speed (cpb) of ACORN for different message length on Intel Skylake processor

	64B	128B	256B	512B	1024B	2048B	4096B
encryption	38.2	23.2	15.4	11.8	11.2	8.8	8.2
decryption	37.8	22.1	14.3	10.5	8.4	7.5	7.1

Chapter 6

Design Rationale

ACORN is designed to be efficient in hardware (focus), and also efficient in software.

In order to be efficient in hardware, we use a bit-based stream cipher for its well-known hardware efficiency (such as A5/1 [1], Grain [15] and Trivium [8]). In order to resist the traditional attacks (correlation attacks [21, 20, 17, 18, 5] and algebraic attacks [6, 7]) on stream cipher, the state is updated in a nonlinear way, and every state bit affects the whole state.

We inject message into the state so that we could obtain authentication security almost for free. The challenge is that in a bit-based sequential stream cipher based on nonlinear feedback registers, it is tremendously difficult to trace the differential propagation in the state, especially if we want to achieve high authentication security (such as 128-bit). Our design focus is to solve this problem so that the authentication security could be easily analyzed. Our solution is to use the concatenation of several linear feedback shift registers to ensure that once there is difference in the state, the number of difference bits in the state would be sufficiently large before the difference gets eliminated. When there are difference bits in the state, the nonlinear function *FBK* introduces difference noise to the feedback bit f_i so as to reduce the success rate of forgery attack. If an attacker intends to modify the ciphertext, the difference in the keystream bits would also affect the state through the decrypted plaintext bits.

In order to further reduce the hardware complexity, ACORN does not check the message length in decryption and verification, and the padding bits (both length and values) are always fixed. In order to separate the processing of associated data and plaintext/ciphertext, the cipher feedback is modified for 128 steps (through modifying ca_i) before the plaintext/ciphertext gets processed. Similarly, in order to separate the processing of plaintext/ciphertext and the finalization, the cipher feedback is modified (through modifying ca_i) for 256 bits before the finalization. Separating the plaintext from the associated data means that an attacker cannot use part of the plaintext bits as associated data, and vice versa. Separating the encryption/decryption from the finalization means that an attacker cannot use part of the keystream as authentication tag.

In order to be fast in hardware and software, 32 steps of ACORN can be computed in parallel.

In order to have high security for stream cipher, when we select the tap positions, we try to have tap distances which are prime or contain some large prime factor.

In order to resist the differential attack against ACORN for fixed IV (such as the differential attack against Phelix [25]), we require that each key/IV pair is used to protect only one message, and the decrypted plaintext should not be disclosed if the verification fails.

6.1 Response to the review comments

The anonymous CAESAR committee members gave helpful comments on ACORN. We provide below explanation to some comments.

1. The purpose of introducing a small (four-bit) register at the input end of NLFSR is to ensure that the state update function is invertible (for the known key); otherwise, we have an non-invertible state update function which is not good for security (such as the differential attacks against the non-invertible initialization of Py [24] and ZUC [26]), and not good for the period of keystream.

The reason that the size of the small register is 4 bits is that we get a 293-bit state. Here, 293 is prime, so this overall tap distance 293 is coprime to all the tap distances in the NLFSR. In the design of stream ciphers, the coprime tap distances are important to security.

2. Separating the associated data from plaintext/ciphertext means preventing an attacker from using part of the associated data as plaintext/ciphertext, and vice versa. Separating the encryption/decryption from the finalization means preventing an attacker from reducing the size of plaintext/ciphertext, and use part of the keystream as authentication tag. The reason is that in ACORN, we generate the tag in a similar way as generating keystream (so as to reduce hardware cost).
3. In Appendix A, we provide all the differential components in the computation of the forgery success rate of 2^{-181} .

Chapter 7

Changes

7.1 Changes in the third round submission

Tweak. We tweaked ACORN in the third round submission. The tweak is to move the function $ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66})$ from the feedback function to the output filtering function. The tweak is to provide large security margin against the guess-and-determine attack. The tweak does not affect the performance of ACORN. The tweak does not affect the security analysis of the initialization and finalization, and the tweak does not affect the integrity analysis of ACORN.

The new output filtering function and nonlinear feedback function are given below:

$$\begin{aligned} ks_i &= S_{i,12} \oplus S_{i,154} \oplus maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193}) \oplus ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66}); \\ f_i &= S_{i,0} \oplus (\sim S_{i,107}) \oplus maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160}) \oplus (ca_i \& S_{i,196}) \oplus (cb_i \& ks_i) ; \end{aligned}$$

Security Analysis. We added the security analysis against differential cryptanalysis and cube attack in this document. And we provided the details of authentication security analysis in Appendix A and B. We explained that ACORN is strong against time-memory-data trade-off attack.

We corrected the linear recurrence of the right most LFSR in Section 3.3. It is $d_n = d_{n-59} \oplus d_{n-54}$, instead of $d_n = d_{n-59} \oplus d_{n-53}$. We updated the analysis accordingly, and the authentication security is 2^{-181} (instead of 2^{-189}).

7.2 Changes in the second round submission

We made the following tweaks in the second round submission:

1. The number of steps in the initialization, padding of associated data, padding of plaintext, and finalization are changed from 1536, 512, 512, 512 to 1792, 256, 256, 768, respectively.

The main reason from the change is to increase the steps in the initialization, so as to provide better protection of the secret key when nonce is reused.

2. In the initialization stage, the key bits are now used as inputs in 1664 steps. (In version 1, the key bits are used only in 128 steps.) The reason for this tweak is to strengthen the cipher against the nonce reuse attack (in encryption/decryption) so that the secret key cannot be easily recovered in the nonce reuse attack.

Chapter 8

No Hidden Weakness

We state here that the designer/designers have not hidden any weaknesses in this cipher.

Chapter 9

Intellectual property

We state that ACORN is not patented and it is freely available for all applications.

If any of this information changes, the submitter will promptly (and within at most one month) announce these changes on the `crypto-competitions` mailing list.

Chapter 10

Consent

The submitter hereby consents to all decisions of the CAESAR selection committee regarding the selection or non-selection of this submission as a second-round candidate, a third-round candidate, a finalist, a member of the final portfolio, or any other designation provided by the committee. The submitter understands that the committee will not comment on the algorithms, except that for each selected algorithm the committee will simply cite the previously published analyses that led to the selection of the algorithm. The submitter understands that the selection of some algorithms is not a negative comment regarding other algorithms, and that an excellent algorithm might fail to be selected simply because not enough analysis was available at the time of the committee decision. The submitter acknowledges that the committee decisions reflect the collective expert judgments of the committee members and are not subject to appeal. The submitter understands that if he disagrees with published analyses then he is expected to promptly and publicly respond to those analyses, not to wait for subsequent committee decisions. The submitter understands that this statement is required as a condition of consideration of this submission by the CAESAR selection committee.

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Appendix A

Computing the Probability of Eliminating the State Difference

In Section 3.3, we analyzed the security of message authentication. Our analysis shows that the probability to eliminate the difference in the state is 2^{-181} when there is difference in ciphertext or associated data. Table A.1 shows how the differential probability is calculated in each step (the complete differences in the state are given in Appendix B). The first column gives the step number, the following 9 columns indicates whether there is difference in a state bit $S_{i,j}$ in the i th step, and 1 indicates that there is difference. **Here the S_i is the state of the i th step after being updated using the LFSRs, and before the shift operation.** P_i is the probability at the i step that an attacker can eliminate the difference introduced in the feedback.

We illustrate Table A.1 using several examples. At the 50th step, the function $maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160})$ is active since there is difference in $S_{i,244}$, and the chance is half that an attacker can eliminate the difference of this function. At the 58th step, the function $maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193})$ is active since there is difference in $S_{i,235}$, and the chance is half that an attacker can eliminate the difference of this function. At the 63th step, the function $ch(S_{i,230}, S_{i,111}, S_{i,66})$ is active since there is difference in $S_{i,230}$, and the chance is half that an attacker can eliminate the difference of this function. At the 92th step, $maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193})$ and $maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160})$ are active since there are differences in $S_{i,235}$ and $maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160})$, the chance is still half that an attacker can eliminate the difference of $maj(S_{i,235}, S_{i,61}, S_{i,193}) \oplus maj(S_{i,244}, S_{i,23}, S_{i,160})$.

Table A.1 Differential probability in each step of eliminating the state difference

step	$S_{i,235}$	$S_{i,61}$	$S_{i,193}$	$S_{i,230}$	$S_{i,111}$	$S_{i,66}$	$S_{i,244}$	$S_{i,23}$	$S_{i,160}$	P_i
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
42	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
46	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
49	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
52	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
58	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
62	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
63	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
71	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
73	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
74	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
76	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
77	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
78	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
79	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
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83	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
84	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
86	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
87	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
88	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
89	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
90	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
91	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
92	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

95	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
96	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
97	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
99	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
100	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
101	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
102	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
103	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
104	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
105	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
106	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
107	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
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109	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
110	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
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119	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
120	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
121	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
122	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
123	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
124	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
125	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
126	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
127	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
128	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
129	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
130	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
131	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
132	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
133	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
134	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
135	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
136	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
137	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
138	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
139	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
140	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
141	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5

142	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
143	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
144	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
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157	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
158	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
159	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
160	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
161	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
162	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
163	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
164	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
165	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
166	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
167	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
168	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
169	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
170	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
171	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
172	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
173	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
174	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
175	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
176	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
177	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
178	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
179	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
180	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
181	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
182	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
183	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
184	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
185	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
186	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
187	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
188	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5

189	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
190	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
191	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
192	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
193	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
194	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
195	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
196	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
197	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
198	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
199	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
200	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
201	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
202	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
203	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
204	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
205	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
206	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
207	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
208	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
209	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
210	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
211	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
212	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
213	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
214	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
215	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
216	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
217	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
218	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
219	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
220	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
221	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
222	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
223	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
224	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
225	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
226	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
227	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.5
228	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
229	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
230	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
231	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
232	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
233	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
234	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
235	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5

236	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
237	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
238	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
239	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
240	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
241	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
242	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
243	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
244	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
245	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
246	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
247	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
248	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
249	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
250	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
251	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
252	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
253	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
254	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
255	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
256	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
257	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
258	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
259	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
260	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
261	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
262	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
263	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
264	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
265	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.5
266	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
267	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
268	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
269	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
270	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.5
271	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
272	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
273	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
274	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
275	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
276	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
277	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
278	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
279	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
280	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
281	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
282	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5

283	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
284	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
285	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
286	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
287	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
288	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.5
289	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
290	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
291	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
292	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
293	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
294	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

0010000100000000000001000000000000001010001001100010000
000101001100000100000110010001001100101001001011101110000010
11010110010111000001101011010000110111101111110010111
step 213:
00
000000000000000000100010
0100001000000000000001000000000000000101000100110001000000
001010011000001000001100100010011001010010010111011100000101
10101100101110000011010110100001101111011111100100111
step 214:
00
0000000000000000001000100
10000100000000000000100000000000000001010001001100010000000
010100110000000000011001000100110010100100101110110000001011
01011001011100000110101101000011011110111111001000111
step 215:
00
00000000000000000010001001
000010000000000000010000000000000000010100010011000100000000
101001100000000000110010001001100101001001011101100000010110
10110010111000001101011010000110111101111110010000111
step 216:
00
000000000000000000100010010
0001000000000000001000000000000000000101000100110001000000001
0100110000000000001100100010011001010010010111011000000101101
01100101110000011010110100001101111011111100100001111
step 217:
00
0000000000000000001000100100
00100000000000000010000000000000000001010001001100010000000010
1001100000000000011001000100110010100100101110110001001011010
11001011100000110101101000011011110111111001000010111
step 218:
00
00000000000000000010001001000
010000000000000000100000000000000000010100010011000100000000101
00110000000000000110010001001100101001001011101100011010110101
10010111000001101011010000110111101111110010000100111
step 219:
00
000000000000000000100010010000
1000000000000000001000000000000000000101000100110001000000001010
0110000000000001100100010011001010010010111011000110101101011
00101110000011010110100001101111011111100100001001111
step 220:
00
0000000000000000001000100100001
0000000000000000001000100100
1100000000000000001001000100110010100100101110110001100011010110
1100000000000000001001000100110010100100101110110001100011010110

01011100001101011010001101111011111001000010011111
step 221:
00
00000000000100
00000000000010000000000000000000000000010011000100000000101001
10000000000000010001001100101001001011101100011000110101100
1011100001101011010000110111101111110010000100111111
step 222:
00
0000000000010010010000100
00000000000010000000000000000000000000010000100110001000000001010011
00000000000010100010011001010010010111011000110001101011001
0111000011010110100001101111011111100100001001111111
step 223:
00
00000000001000100100001000
0000000000010000000000000000001000011001100010000000010100110
000000000000101000100110010100100101110110001100011010110010
1110000110101101000011011110111111001000010011111110
step 224:
00
0000000001001001000010000
000000000010000000000000000010000100011000100000000101001100
000000000001000001001100101001001011101100011000111101100101
11000001101011010000110111101111110010000100111111100
step 225:
00
00000000100010010000100000
00000000010000000000000000100001000110001000000001010011000
000000000010000010011001010010010111011000110001110011001011
10000011010110100001101111011111100100001001111110001
step 226:
00
00000000100010010000100000
000000001000100110000
00000000100010100110010100100101110110001100011100110010010111
00000110101101000011011110111111001000010011111101010
step 227:
00
0000001000100000001000000
0000000100000000000000001000010000100010000000010100110000
0000000010001110011001010010010111011000110001110011001001110
00001101011010000110111101111110010000100111111011100
step 228:
00
000001001000000010000000
0000001000000000000000001000010000000100000000101001100000
000000010001100011001010010010111011000110001110011001011100
0001101011010000110111101111110010000100111111011100
step 229:
00

00000000000001000010000000000000010100110000000000010
00110001000000010010111011000110001110011100010000000110101
101000011011110111110010000100111111011111001000010
step 238:
0010000
001000
0000000000000100001000000000000000010100110000000000000100
011000100000000100101110110001100011100111000100000001101011
010000110111101111100100001001111110111110010000100
step 239:
00100000
0010000
00000000000001000010000000000000000101001100000000000001000
110001000000001001011101100011000111001110001000000011010110
1000011011110111110010000100111111011111100100000000
step 240:
001000000
00100000
000000000000010000100000000000000001010011000000000000010001
100010000000000010111011000110001110011100010000000110101101
000011011110111110010000100111111011111100100000000
step 241:
001000000
00100000
0000000000001000010000000000000000010100110000000000000100011
0001000000000000101110110001100011100111000100000001101011010
000110111101111100100001001111110111111001000000000
step 242:
0010000000
001000000
00000000000100001000000000000000000101001100000000000001000110
001000000000001011101100011000111001110001000000010010110100
001101111011111001000010011111101111110010000000000
step 243:
0010000000
001000000
000000000010000100000000000000000001000011000000000000010001100
010000000000000111011000110001110011100010000000100101101000
011011110111110010000100111111011111100100000000001
step 244:
0010000000
001000000
000000001000010010001100
10000000000001110110001100011100111000100000001000011010000
110111101111100100001001111110111111001000000000011
step 245:
0010000000
001000000
00000000100001001000110001
000000000000011101100011000111001110001000000010001110100001

